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 Chapter 4 
 
Will the Market Keep Brazil Lit Up? Ownership and Market 
Structural Changes in the Electric Power Sector* 
 
Nobuaki Hamaguchi 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This paper will analyze some of the consequences of the privatization process that began 
in 1995 in the Brazilian electricity sector. The privatization program constituted an 
important part of the Brazilian industrial restructuring process in the 1990s, and brought 
far-reaching results to various sectors of the economy.1 However, despite the 
announcement of a quite ambitious sectoral reform plan, the privatization of electricity 
progressed very slowly and incompletely. This unsatisfactory performance owes partly to 
political pressure against privatization but, at the same time, it concerns the very nature of 
the industry. 
The electricity industry is often considered as a typical example of a natural 
monopoly because of the requirements for large-scale investments, making a single firm 
operation most efficient due to economies of scale (see Stiglitz 1999, chap. 8). This 
specific characteristic leads to the justification of public ownership on both economic and 
political grounds. Economically, economies of scale implies that production by a 
nonregulated private monopoly will fall short of the socially optimal supply. Politically, 
public ownership allows the government to secure the nondiscriminatory provision of 
services to marginal populations who might be underserviced by private firms. As Shleifer 
(1998) recalls, about a half century ago, future Nobel laureates like Arthur Lewis and 
James Meade were concerned with monopoly power and supported the public ownership 
(or the socialization of firms), motivated partly by the successes of government control 
during the war, the failure of competition and regulation during the Great Depression, and 
the apparent success of the Soviet Union’s industrialization. 
                                                             
* This chapter first appeared in The Developing Economies 40(4), December 2002. 
Recently, however, publicly owned enterprises have been criticized as inherently 
inefficient, leading to the global phenomenon of privatization. Public enterprises come 
under criticism when their operations are directed wrong goals, or they are badly managed. 
The main source of misdirection is political interventions aimed at realizing private 
objectives. Bad management often stems from the low morals of bureaucratic managers 
trying to rationalize operations to maximize social benefits at minimum cost. The 
theoretical literature points to problems in incentive structures, principal-agent problems, 
and soft budget constraints (Kornai 1986), as well as the absence of takeover threats, 
among others. 
With pro-privatization arguments prevailing, an increasing number of public 
utilities in developing countries have been acquired by foreign enterprises. This is partly 
due to the lack of capacity by local capital to assume responsibility for the large amount 
of fixed investments with long-term maturities. On the other hand, since their business is 
basically nontradable, public utility enterprises in industrialized countries are motivated to 
invest in foreign countries in order to increase their customer base as well as to neutralize 
market risks by diversifying their markets, and avoiding dependence on the market 
situation of one country. Foreign companies are also favored by the developed capital 
markets in their home countries, which enable them to move into new markets. Thus, 
privatization simultaneously stimulated the trend toward the internationalization of the 
ownership of productive assets in developing countries and the globalization of a number 
of transnational enterprises.2 
It is also important to understand that developing countries are under pressure 
from international rating agencies and Washington-based international institutions, whose 
main concern is macroeconomic imbalances with a particular focus on government 
accounts. Since their evaluations have a tremendous impact on external financing, many 
highly indebted countries, particularly in Latin America, found it beneficial to sell 
government assets not only to obtain financial revenues from their liquidation, but also 
because tight fiscal constraints have made it impossible for governments to promote social 
welfare without assistance. 
The current core of the discussion on private/public ownership and development 
is how to transfer property rights orderly, ensuring that their monopolistic behavior does 
not worsen public welfare. Since public ownership was developed under a particular 
institutional arrangement, privatization does not simply mean the transfer of ownership, 
but also requires comprehensive systemic reform. Accordingly, the role of the government 
should be shifted from being a direct provider to a regulator. This task is complex and 
requires the careful elaboration of a sophisticated regulatory framework. Thus, in contrast 
to the private mergers and acquisitions, which were triggered by a series of deregulation 
measures and stimulated new patterns of competition, privatization was induced by 
external pressures, and has required the establishment of appropriate regulatory 
frameworks following the change of ownership. 
By focusing on Brazilian electricity we intend to contribute to the discussion on 
problems arising from the ownership change of public utilities in developing countries 
given limited regulatory capability and economic uncertainties. The sector was initially 
developed under public ownership, but the macroeconomic situation of the 1990s made 
privatization inevitable. However, privatization was implemented under poor planning 
and coordination. Not only did it fail to bring the ownership change to completion, but it 
was also unable to create attractive market conditions to stimulate investment into 
capacity expansion. Our analysis finds that the delayed privatization of generation and 
transmission led to a long period of defensive adjustment, with low investments and cuts 
in expenditures. Insufficient capacity building, associated with the rainfall shortage in 
1999-2001, led to a severe energy crisis, obliging the population to cut back at least 20 per 
cent on their energy consumption. 
In the following section, we will begin our discussion by reviewing the 
theoretical literature on the effect of ownership on enterprise performance, from the 
perspective of private versus public. Based upon this understanding, the logic of the 
privatization of electricity in Brazil will be characterized in Section III. Then, after 
reviewing the historical background of the Brazilian electricity sector in Section IV, we 
will analyze the structural reforms in Sections V to VII. Section VIII will present the 
reactions of firms, as shown by their financial data. The last section will conclude the 
discussion. 
 
II. Ownership Matters: A Review of the Theoretical Literature 
 
This section provides a selective survey of economic theory on how ownership matters in 
the provision of public utility3 and of the principal obstacles to privatization. Following 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988), a public enterprise is defined as one: (a) not maximizing 
profit, (b) with no marketable ordinary shares in the firm, and (c) being sustained by 
public funding. This means that the manager of a public enterprise is supposed to 
maximize the social welfare as an agent of the government, which in turn represents the 
public interest, while the internal efficiency of its operation is allowed to be a secondary 
objective, thanks to the absence of the takeover threat. Instead of engaging in in-house 
production, the government can contract private enterprises to achieve the same objective. 
Private enterprises are profit seeking, and will choose the most efficient method under the 
conditions imposed by the government. The point at issue is whether privately owned 
enterprises can achieve given social objectives more efficiently than public ones. 
We start by recalling that although publicly owned enterprises do not seek efficiency, it is 
nevertheless possible for them to be operated as efficiently as privately owned enterprises 
under appropriate incentive structure arrangements (Williamson 1985). A complementary 
view presented by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987, p. 568) states that “all of the 
government’s objectives can be attained by an appropriately designed auction of the 
rights to produce a given product or service.” The latter conclusion depends on: (1) 
auction for the ownership market being competitive and the bidders sharing symmetric 
information about the least cost production technology; and (2) the government being 
able to write a perfect contract or the cost of intervention into delegated production being 
low. The first condition implies the extraction of monopoly rents through a competitive 
ownership market and no technological rents or barriers to entry due to symmetry 
regarding technical information. The second condition ensures that the delegated private 
firm will choose the most efficient production whose output will be paid the amount 
exactly equal to its social valuation, which is known to the government. These views lead 
to the neutrality theorem of Shapiro and Willig (1990) which states that ownership does 
not matter if the eventualities are contractible, all private information is revealed, and 
there is no cost of raising government funds for the tax and incentive policies. 
Thus, any ownership debate must start from assuming away at least one of these 
neutrality conditions. The problem of incomplete contracts called the attention of various 
researchers from industrial organizations, such as Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), 
Schmidt (1996) and Laffont and Tirole (1994). Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) adopt 
the notion of the residual rights of control introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986).4 It is 
assumed that the enterprise manager, whether public or private, can invest in quality 
improvements and cost reductions in order to obtain more customers and maximize profit, 
but that cost reductions have an adverse effect on quality. Neither effort is contractible ex 
ante. In the case of public ownership, the fruits of noncontractible management efforts 
belong to the government. The manager is unlikely to invest in this case, since he knows 
that the reward for his effort will be exploited. By contrast, since privately owned 
enterprises are fully entitled to residual control rights, privatization will create stronger 
incentives for both types of efficiency improvement. Yet, despite the cost reductions, 
consumers may be worse off if: (1) the privatized firm depends too heavily on lowering 
quality to reduce costs; or (2) incentives for quality improvement are either unimportant 
or do not differ much depending on the ownership structure. Laffont and Tirole (1994) 
further remark that if we assume the problem of incomplete contracts between the private 
owner and the manager in the private ownership case, the manager may produce 
inefficient results as he tries to respond to two masters, the regulator and the shareholders. 
Shapiro and Willig (1990) developed an argument regarding the relationship between 
ownership structures and locations of undisclosed information. According to their 
formalization of public ownership, a minister represents the public interest and controls 
the firm. He has access to information about both internal efficiency and social effects, 
and maximizes social welfare, aggregating the social benefit and enterprise’s profit. But 
the minister does not necessarily choose the first best solution, because he also tries to 
maximize his private benefits, which are not observable from outside. On the other hand, 
if the company is privately owned, it pursues profit maximization based on private 
information on internal efficiency. A regulator then conducts tax and incentive policies to 
guide the production level to the socially most desirable level. The less the regulator is 
informed and the more information is privately held by a manager, the more the regulator 
will have to pay to change the company’s decision. Within this framework, privatization 
means a shift of undisclosed information from the minister to the private manager. 
Private ownership is more welfare enhancing when the minister/regulator has greater 
discretionary power to redirect the enterprise to pursue his private interest. This implies 
that a transparent democratic political regime would reduce such a risk. On the other hand, 
privatization may yield undesirable outcomes if the information rent for redirecting the 
firm’s decision is very high. 
The question of political interference has been one of central themes of the debate on 
public ownership. Vickers and Yarrow (1991) demonstrate that privatization reduces 
political influence and increases the influence of capital market factors. Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1996) consider political influence to still be workable under private 
ownership if shareholders can be convinced by giving subsidies sufficient to compensate 
for the foregone profit. Thus, privatization alone cannot achieve increased efficiency 
unless the Treasury implements strict monetary controls to raise the cost of politicians 
boosting their political benefits. 
Thus, one cannot state that private ownership is always more efficient than 
public ownership. The success or failure of privatization depends on local circumstances 
and the idiosyncratic features of particular industries with regard to market conditions, 
contractibility of eventualities, and information structure. If the results are so 
inconclusive, why has privatization become such a global phenomenon? 
On this point, Yarrow (1998) points out that strong fiscal pressure increased the 
political cost of destabilizing macroeconomic conditions by increasing the public account 
deficit. Although he apparently underestimates the cost of contracting private firms, and 
fails to take into consideration information rent and incomplete contracts, the notion of 
identifying public ownership as a luxury is increasingly gaining force. For example, a 
World Bank report found an inverse correlation between the weight of publicly owned 
enterprises and economic growth, with the reason being that the bureaucrats are still in 
business that there is a lack of political will for public sector reform (World Bank 1995). 
This kind of ideology5 is widely held in the international financial community, including 
country risk rating agencies. Thus, it seems that privatization has been set as an a priori 
policy objective to demonstrate the determination for sound macroeconomic management, 
apart from analysis of the welfare consequence of ownership change. 
Since the supremacy of this macroeconomic logic has become clear in the 
development policy agenda, many countries continue to seek ways to protect social 
welfare by regulation. However, there is great difficulty in implementing regulations in 
developing countries, due to the lack of monitoring ability of agencies, lack of market 
infrastructure promoting competition, and the highly asymmetric location of information. 
Furthermore, while excessive monopolistic rents can be prevented by promoting market 
competition, the government should also promote additional capacity in order to secure 
stable supply. For the latter purpose, the interests of delegated producers need to be 
protected in the long term, to induce investment. In some cases, the promotion of 
investment may require coordination among participants to share the protected rent, this 
contradiction makes regulation a very complicated task. 
 
III. Privatization in Brazil 
 
The Brazilian experience of privatization provides an excellent opportunity for examining 
the controversies raised above. During the ten years from 1991 to 2001, privatization 
generated revenues of about U.S.$103 billion, including U.S.$85 billion in cash and 
U.S.$18 billion in debt transferred to the private sector. This is the largest privatization 
program ever conducted among developing countries and transition economies. It tells us 
something about the significance in size and scope of the privatization process, while 
reminding us of the predominant position held until then by the state in the Brazilian 
economy. 
The program proceeded in three parts: (1) the National Denationalization Program (PND) 
promoted by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) since 
1991; (2) the privatization of telecommunication (Telebrás system) implemented in 1998 
by the Ministry of Communication; and (3) the privatization of firms owned by local 
states, which conducted their own privatization programs starting from 1995. Table I 
shows that with PND and Telebrás, the federal government accounted for two-thirds of 
the total results, and that the remaining a third were handled by the state governments. 
There were two phases in the process. The first corresponds to 1991-94, under President 
Collor and, after his impeachment, by his successor President Franco.6 PND during this 
period included manufacturing firms in areas such as steel (Usiminas, CSN, CST, Cosipa, 
Açominas), petrochemicals (Copesul, Petroflex, Fosfertil), and aircraft (Embraer), 
resulting in revenues of U.S.$11.5 billion. These firms were the legacies of the import-
substituting industrial policy that had been pursued until the mid-1980s, in which the 
government had attributed strategic roles to these industries for deepening and widening 
industrialization. But their competitiveness was hampered by the limited size of the 
domestic market as well as by the inability of public finance to continue supplying the 
funds to build new technological capabilities. 
As shown by Figure 1, revenues from privatization increased from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 
1991 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1993. This revenue was utilized to reduce central 
government debt, and paved the way to sounder public finances in the later stage. 
Between 1991 and 1994, the total stock of public sector debt fell from 38.6 per cent to 
30.4 per cent of GDP. There were no major political obstacles as the separation of these 
enterprises did not threaten the public interest as far as social welfare issues were 
concerned, except for some nationalistic reaction against selling natural resource-related 
companies to foreign ownership.7 As discussed by Yarrow (1998), the privatization 
program was vigorously pursued as one of major macroeconomic policy instruments. 
However, it was also expected that privatization would promote the efficient management 
of firms. It is useful to remember that Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) present the 
proposition that a competitive environment is essential in a post-privatization market to 
stimulate efforts to enhance productivity. In this regard, the liberalization of imports, 
which took place under the Collor administration, was an important impetus. We can 
observe that the consolidation of the steel industry, triggered by privatization and 
international competition, made some Brazilian steel enterprises such as CSN, Usiminas, 
and Gerdau global players. In another instance, the aircraft producer, Embraer, has 
become the country’s most active export company. Pinehiro (1996) conducted a 
comprehensive statistical study, finding a substantial increase in the operational 
efficiency of firms privatized during the first phase. 
The macroeconomic situation of the country deteriorated in the first half of the 1990s. 
The annual inflation rate surged to the four-digit level and the 1995 budget deficit, 
measured as the public sector borrowing requirement, amounted to 7.3 per cent of GDP, 
to which public enterprises contributed 1.3 percentage points.8 While the implementation 
of the PND was delayed due to the populist characteristics of President Franco’s 
administration, the continuing fiscal crisis paved the way for the second phase of the 
privatization under President Cardoso beginning in 1995, as a part of the stabilization 
plan of his administration, the “Plano Real.” 
In the second phase, the scope of privatization was broadened to include public utilities 
(electric power, telephones, roads, railways, ports) and the banking sector. These 
enterprises were originally created to fill the vacuum of interests in the private sector and 
to promote the wide provision of services. However, as shown by the deterioration of 
infrastructure conditions due to a lack of adequate investment and maintenance, it was 
already evident that the state of government accounts was too fragile to allow compliance 
with such a mission. 
Given this fact, the government could have chosen either to privatize or to strengthen 
corporate governance in order to restore the financial equilibrium of each firm. The 
adoption of the first option was associated with several local features. Firstly, political 
interventions had already seriously distorted the management of these firms in favor of 
the private agendas of politicians. Especially at the local state level, it would have been 
difficult to restore management discipline in the short to medium term. It was expected 
that profit-seeking private firms would opt for efficient production and benefit consumers 
with lower costs and higher quality of services. Secondly, the government was 
pessimistic about its future financial capability for the infrastructure investments that 
would be necessary to avoid bottlenecks to economic growth. Thirdly, it was expected 
that privatization would have a positive macroeconomic impact in the short run, by 
increasing revenues, reducing public debt, and increasing foreign direct investment, thus 
reducing pressure on the balance of payments. Fourthly, demonstrating a determination to 
carry out privatization would increase confidence in Brazilian economic management. 
Given the political decision to implement privatization, the introduction of several 
institutional reforms was in order. Among others, a crucial step was the establishment of 
the Law of Concessions of 1995. It prescribed that a competitive auction should give a 
concessionaire a license to operate public utilities for a fixed period of time, without 
discrimination regarding the nationality of the capital. As reviewed in the previous 
section, a competitive ownership market is one of the fundamental conditions for 
successful privatization. Also, by giving regulators the right to intervene and terminate 
contracts in case of noncompliance of required obligations, the law strengthened their 
voice. 
It addition, in order to stimulate state government privatization programs, the federal 
government launched a program which allowed the restructuring of state debt with the 
federal government at low interest rates and long-term maturity, conditional upon an 
initial cash payment of no less than 20 per cent of the outstanding debt. For most state 
governments, privatization was the only means to obtain such funds. 
The success of the “Plano Real” also gave crucial momentum to the progress of the 
privatization program. Stabilization boosted confidence in the Brazilian economy and 
increased investors’ interest in privatization auctions. The participation of foreign 
investors in privatization was fundamental to covering the current account deficit without 
creating pressure in the foreign exchange market. This had a strong implication for the 
“Plano Real” to use fixed nominal exchange rate as the anchor of the monetary policy. 
This synergistic effect between stabilization and privatization became apparent around 
1997-98 (Pinheiro 2000) and privatization continues to be important part of 
macroeconomic policy, generating total revenues of U.S.$91.5 billion between 1995 and 
2000. 
While privatization has enriched the cash inflow to the government, new challenges have 
arisen about how to ensure that privatized firms honor the public interest. The public 
interest resides in the provision of services with regularity, continuity, efficiency, safety, 
technological modernity, and nondiscriminatory access. Compliance with these 
conditions requires investment, which can be promoted by guaranteeing profit-making 
opportunities. It is also in the public interest that abuses of market power are not allowed 
and that services are provided at low cost. For these purposes, an adequate combination 
of competition policy and incentive policy is the complicated task for regulatory agencies. 
The previous review of theories suggests that it is crucial for the regulatory agency to set 
clear rules to establish confidence between the regulator and firms in order to minimize 
the information asymmetry problem and increase the efficacy of privatization contracts. 
In the remaining part of this paper, these issues shall be examined in more detail, through 
an analysis of the case of the electricity sector. 
 
IV. The Rise and Fall of Public Ownership in the Brazilian Electricity Sector 
 
The evolution of Brazil’s electricity sector can be characterized by four phases of changes 
in ownership structure: 
Private ownership with minimal regulatory control (until 1930); 
Private ownership with poor regulation (from the 1930s to the1940s); 
State ownership with centralized control (from the 1950s to the first half of the 
1990s); and 
Mixed ownership, increasing privatization, with more sophisticated regulation 
(since the second half of the 1990s). 
As we can observe in Figure 2, these regime changes were prompted by periods of 
saturation of previous models, portrayed by the low growth rates of installed capacity in 
the 1930s and 40s and between the mid-1980s and 1990s. 
Until the first crisis during the 1930s and 40s, the liberal political regime that held power 
at the time left the responsibility for the development of infrastructure to local 
governments. Municipal governments granted concession contracts to private companies, 
most of which were of foreign origin. The Canadian company Light and the American 
company Amforp were particularly dominant. Their investments were concentrated 
especially in the more profitable markets in wealthier São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. They 
were favored by contracts which granted automatic tariff adjustments in accordance with 
currency depreciations, and there was little intervention from the federal government. 
Beginning in 1931, President Getúlio Vargas introduced a nationalistic political regime, 
and strengthened centralized control. Previous arrangements between local governments 
and private electric power companies were suspended, and were placed under the 
regulation of the federal government. The basic idea of the regulation was to force 
investments while controlling the tariff, so as to assure a 10 per cent return on the 
historical cost of capital and granting local monopoly status to concessionaires. 
However, the minimum rate of return guarantee was ignored in order to keep electricity 
tariffs at a lower level. The relations between the regulator and regulated companies 
became confrontational as the federal government began to charge that the private foreign 
companies were remitting large profits to their home countries. The government also 
complained about the lack of attention to high-cost consumers, namely, poor populations 
living in the outskirts of big cities and in rural areas. These conflicts reduced investments 
during the 1930s and 1940s, leading to power shortages for prolonged periods. The 
government stopped granting new concessions, contributing further to a decline in the 
growth of power supply capacity. 
The government responded to the energy shortage by increasing public investments. 
President Vargas announced the National Electrification Plan during his second term, and 
inaugurated Chesf in 1954 in the poor Northeastern region and Furnas in the 
industrialized Southeastern region in 1957. Some state governments also established their 
own power companies. In particular, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo 
made substantial investments financed by the National Economic Development Bank 
(BNDE). As a result, the share of the public sector in total installed generation capacity 
expanded from 6.8 per cent in 1952 to 54.6 per cent in 1965, while the share of the 
private sector shrunk from 82.4 per cent to 33.6 per cent. 
The public ownership model was gradually consolidated during the 1960s and 1970s 
through the creation of the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) in 1960 and the 
Electric Power Company of Brazil (Eletrobrás) in 1962. The MME took responsibility for 
regulation and Eletrobrás became responsible for planning and implementation. 
By the mid-1970s, Eletrobrás had become the most powerful institution in the sector. It 
became a holding company, controlling four regional generation-transmission utilities: 
Chesf (Northeast), Furnas (Southeast and Central-West), and Eletronorte (North) and 
Eletrosul (South). These regional utilities produced and delivered electricity to local 
power distributors, which were owned by state governments. Later, the power generation 
capacity of this holding company was further strengthened with the inauguration of a 
wholly owned nuclear plant and the Itaipú Binational Hydroelectric Power Generation, 
where Eletrobrás shared control with the government of Paraguay. By the mid-1980s, 
Eletrobrás accounted for more than 60 per cent of Brazil’s total electric power supply 
capacity, with the state power companies responsible for the remainder. 
Eletrobrás controlled the Group of Coordination of Interconnected Operation (GCOI), 
which operated most of regional transmission networks and high voltage interregional 
transmission lines (North-Northeast in 1984, South-Southeast in 1986, and North-South 
in 1999) and traced the planning of their expansion. As a project financier as well, 
Eletrobrás provided intermediation for government funding and provided sovereign 
guarantees to syndicated loans to electric power companies during the 1970s. 
The MME established a regulatory authority, the National Department of Water and 
Electric Energy (DNAEE), which was responsible for authorizing concessions for 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution as well as determining tariffs. Yet, 
the role of the DNAEE as a regulator was quite limited since development planning was 
actually concentrated in Eletrobrás, and competition for concessions did not exist until 
the implementation of the Concession Law of 1995. Moreover, tariff adjustments were 
automatic, guaranteeing a minimum rate of return on invested capital, and there were no 
instruments to stimulate productivity increases. When the regulated tariff revenue fell 
short of the promised rate of return, the difference was filled by public expenditures 
credited in the Balance Compensation Account (CRC). Further regulations, introduced in 
1974, established the national equalization of tariffs, regardless of differences in the 
marginal costs of each regional network. Eventual differences in profitability were later 
leveled through transfers from companies in surplus to others in deficit. Thus, electricity 
firms were guaranteed profits, at least on paper. It was even said, “the regulator was in 
hands of the regulated” (Ferreira 2000, p. 188), since most of DNAEE’s technical officers 
were loaned from the power companies. 
In retrospect, the public ownership regime contributed to spectacular growth in 
electric generation capacity: a roughly ten times increase from 1955 to 1980. According 
to the same data used for Figure 2, the average annual growth rate of generation capacity 
during this period was 9.2 per cent. It is worth mentioning that Eletrobrás was successful 
in implementing the electrification of the rural Northeast and the development of the 
Tucuruí power plant in the North, allowing energy-consuming industries such as 
aluminum to locate there, while the expansion of Furnas supported industrialization in the 
Southeast. 
To a great extent, this spectacular growth owed to the funding capability of 
Eletrobrás. Public ownership was suitable for development in its early stage. Vertical 
integration allowed the internalization of the information problem. Large-scale reservoirs 
for power generation and transmission lines were constructed in response to demand 
projections based on ambitious industrialization plans. External borrowing and credit 
from the National Economic Development Bank were channeled through Eletrobrás. 
However, as pointed out by Baer and McDonald (1998),9 the financing structure 
of the Brazilian electricity sector became increasingly vulnerable with the significant 
changes in the 1970s. In 1967, 34.0 per cent of its financing came from internal resources 
(tariff revenue) and 31.9 per cent from state resources, while domestic and foreign loans 
accounted for 13.0 per cent. This structure remained almost unchanged until 1973, but by 
1979 the share of internal resource and state resource had dropped to 24.2 per cent and 
6.1 per cent respectively, and domestic loans had risen to 30.1 per cent and foreign 
finance to 32.0 per cent. In the early 1980s, Brazil faced a sudden deterioration of terms 
of borrowing, and the cost of debt servicing skyrocketed. By 1984, the share of internal 
resources had fallen further to 17.9 per cent, while that of foreign borrowing had risen 
sharply to 62.8 per cent. As a result, while the shares of fixed investment and debt 
servicing in total expenditure were 78 per cent and 15 per cent in 1973, the former 
declined to 26 per cent and the latter increased to 74 per cent in 1984. 
The deterioration of the financial situation of Eletrobrás translated into 
decreasing investment in generation capacity during the 1980s and 1990s, as shown in 
Figure 2. The same applies to transmission lines (Table II). It is important to note that 
there was no expansion of high voltage transmission lines above 500KV in the first half 
of the 1990s. 
Pires (1999) and Ferreira (2000) suggest that these problems are mainly related 
to political interventions. The most serious problem was the use of tariff controls as an 
instrument for the stabilization of inflation. In view of the acceleration of inflation in the 
late 1970s, authorities at the ministries of planning and finance intensified their 
intervention in public utility tariff formation. Adjustments in electricity tariffs always 
lagged behind the rate of inflation. As Figure 3 shows, the electricity tariff declined in 
real terms during the second half of the 1970s throughout the 1980s. Although the energy 
policy authority technically maintained the rate of return guarantee, it was not reflected in 
the actual tariff as the difference was simply accumulated as CRC account credits. Firms 
did not actually have cash flow and accumulated arrears in federal income taxes and 
payments for electricity purchased from Eletrobrás.10 
At the same time, governance problems increased. Since it was common for 
persons without any particular expert knowledge to be politically appointed to executive 
positions, they usually served as agents of populist politicians, collaborating to maintain a 
high level of employment. There were few incentives to rationalize expenditures as 
profits were guaranteed by the rate of return tariff regulation, at least at the surface and as 
long as the budget constraints were soft enough to be able to cover the actual cash flow 
shortage. At the state level, companies were utilized to raise borrowings by proposing 
investment programs, many of which were not even implemented, and the money was 
used for other ends, such as to cover the fiscal deficit. 
By the end of the 1980s, as predicted by the theoretical literature, the Brazilian 
electricity sector under the public ownership model found itself with a serious debt 
overhang, weak investment capability due to lack of cash flow, and low productivity, with 
an excessive labor force. In order to promote productivity growth, reforms were needed 
in the balance sheet structure, regulatory framework including tariff adjustments, and the 
governance structure. 
 
V. Tariff Reform 
 
The restructuring of the electricity sector was initiated in 1993, with tariff system reform. 
It eliminated the tariff equalization, allowing tariff differences across regions, and the 
CRC was subsequently closed. The reform introduced the so-called price cap regulation 
whose standard formula is described by the following equitation: 
IRT={VPA1+VPB0*(p-X) }/PA0, 
where IRT is a tariff adjustment rate ceiling and VPA1 refers to a firm’s uncontrollable 
costs for the year in operation, including water resource utility fees determined by the 
government and the cost of fuel and electricity imports affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations. VPB0 is the controllable costs in the previous year, including labor and 
purchasing of materials and external services, and adjusted to the current value with 
inflation rate p, discounted by the productivity improvement factor X. PA0 is the annual 
total revenue of the previous year. 
This formula implies that IRT is determined by an arbitrary determination by the 
regulator of X. Since the firm’s revenue is capped by IRT・PA0, the formula induces a 
reduction of controllable costs greater than X per cent because the residual belongs to the 
firms. This scheme is coherent with private ownership, under which residual control 
rights belong to companies. If the agency problem between capital owners and managers 
is negligible, productivity improvement efforts are enhanced. However, such incentives 
are weak under public ownership because the residual control rights do not belong to the 
manager, and the public owner in the face of soft budget constraints is not motivated to 
enforce cost reductions. Thus, while the price cap regulation is conducive to productivity 
improvements, the ownership structure matters in determining whether the regulation 
change is effective. 
The formula also suggests that tariff increases can be contained to levels below 
inflation. Therefore, the benefits of cost reductions are theoretically shared with 
consumers. However, once privatization takes place, the fact that information on private 
production costs are not fully visible from the outside implies that regulations should 
encourage information disclosure to adequately determine X. The regulator should also be 
careful to ensure that cost reductions were not achieved through a deterioration of the 
quality of services. To be effective, such a framework requires strong capability by the 
regulatory agency. 
The new tariff scheme was intended to restore the financial equilibrium of 
electric companies, by allowing tariff revenues that could ensure current cost recovery 
and also the generation of the necessary cash flow to implement reasonable investment 
plans. However, the continuing pressure to contain tariff rises in order to control inflation, 
as well as inflation itself, prevented the real values of tariffs from rising quickly in 1993-
94. Only starting from 1996, with the success of the “Plano Real” which reduced inflation 
rates dramatically, did real tariff revenue start to recover slightly (see Figure 3). 
 
VI. Institutional and Regulatory Reform 
 In 1996, the MME contracted consulting firm Coopers & Lybrand to outline a model for 
privatization based on this law. The Coopers & Lybrand (1996) report (hereafter CL 
report) became the basis for the restructuring of the electric power sector. 
It proposed fundamental changes in the structure of the sector. The proposal included not 
only privatization but also the introduction of market competition through the creation of 
a wholesale electricity market. In order to prepare a competitive environment, it made a 
controversial recommendation for the separation of ownership among power generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The historical process of public sector-based development 
had resulted in the sectoral structure centralized around Eletrobrás and vertically 
integrated, as depicted by Figure 4. 
Vertical disintegration became essential for the market-based sectoral model to lead to a 
competitive environment, as it would prevent cross-subsidies from the regulated sector 
(whose profits were guaranteed) to the competitive sector in order to deter the entry of 
competitors. Moreover, it would prevent collusion between different segments. For 
example, a generation company might collude with a transmission company to reject the 
transmission of other generators’ electricity in order to exploit monopoly profits. Or a 
distribution company could conspire with a transmission company to exert monopsonistic 
pressure on generators. 
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of transaction cost theories, vertical integration is 
advantageous in preventing information asymmetry problems, which make risk-avert 
generators cautious about capacity expansion, eventually leading to power shortages. 
Especially due to economies of scale and networks, the transmission segment has 
stronger characteristics of a natural monopoly. 
In 1996, concerned with these conflicting views, Brazil created the National System 
Operator (ONS), a nonprofit private organization representing generation companies and 
distribution companies, to assume the control rights over energy flow. ONS was entrusted 
with operating networks by transmission companies in exchange for receiving a profit-
guaranteeing regulated transmission fee. Real time technical information on the 
availability and cost of supply, location of demand, and level of congestion of energy 
traffic were concentrated in ONS to optimize the system to minimize the marginal cost of 
the integrated power supply system. This institutional change laid the groundwork for 
decentralizing ownership while centralizing the control of the system, as a means to 
internalize network externalities and prevent private information from creating high 
transaction costs. The government planned not only to give the concessions for new 
transmission to private companies but also to privatize the existing transmission networks 
owned by Eletrobrás and the state utilities. The ultimate structure of these ownership 
changes was to have led to Figure 5. 
Cut off from transmission, the generators were considered simply as commodity suppliers 
with much smaller sunken costs. Assuming that no company would have sufficient 
market power, the generators would be induced to minimize costs to maximize profit, 
which in turn would contribute to increasing the efficiency of the system as a whole. On 
the demand side, while large consumers would have direct access to the wholesale market, 
small customers would be represented by distribution companies which would act like 
brokerage agents, with the retail price regulated by a price cap mechanism. By 
encouraging more customers to enter the free market by lowering barriers, competitive 
pressure in the retail market could also be strengthened and cost reductions induced. ONS 
would guarantee nondiscriminatory access to the transmission network for generators and 
consumers. 
The technical role of ONS was complemented by the policy on the regulatory supervision 
of competition laid out by the National Agency for Electrical Energy (ANEEL), which 
was established at the end of 1996. ANEEL obtained financial independence from the 
MME by gaining a special purpose tax as a financial source, and independence from 
political interference regarding the appointment of executive positions, while maintaining 
transparency through public audits as well as the disclosure of financial information 
through the Internet. Among the competencies of ANEEL are the authorization of 
bilateral contracts, realization of auctions for concession, standardization and monitoring 
of quality of services, and regulation of market concentration.11 It is endowed with the 
power of veto over ONS decisions. 
However, from the viewpoint of transaction cost economics, the separation of ownership 
entails problems arising from the previously discussed information problems. Generation 
companies facing competition try to minimize costs and avoid investment. Since 
investments in power generation have long maturity periods, the supply system tends to 
lose its buffer supply, increasing the risk of failure if there is a sudden significant increase 
in demand. Moreover, the unpredictability of investment plans in other subsectors may 
hold investment down at a level lower than what is socially desirable. While the regulator 
expects a sort of formal or informal agreement for coordinating investments among 
private companies (which will also enhance their profit), uncertainties in final demand 
and cost variables12 tend to encourage firms to collude as a means of overcoming those 
externalities (Yarrow 1994). Such difficulties complicated privatization in Brazil, because 
sufficient confidence was not created that market regulation would be compelling enough 
to ensure that the competition-based model would be able to supply energy more 
efficiently than the traditional public ownership model. 
The idea of a competitive wholesale market was put into practice with the approval of 
Law 9648 of 1998, which established the Electricity Wholesale Market (MAE). Initially, 
the MAE was created as a spot market to adjust for real time surpluses/deficits of 
electricity load. Generators with excess supply capacity, and distributors which were 
overloaded after compliance with the bilateral contract, would be sellers,13 while 
generators which could not fulfill bilateral contracts with their own generation and 
distributors in deficit were to be buyers. It differs from the usual concept of a marketplace 
in that the spot price is not defined at the point that clears supply and demand but rather is 
calculated by ONS using engineering computational programs based on the marginal cost 
of the generation output  of the entire system. 
When the MAE was created, it was predicted that the generating companies would prefer 
to sell in the MAE, seeking higher prices and avoiding prices that were fixed for long 
period of time. Out of concern that the sudden transition to the MAE would raise 
consumer tariffs, ANEEL decreed in 1997, prior to its introduction, that all existing 
generators and distributors would have to bilaterally negotiate and sign agreements of so-
called initial contracts, with a duration of nine years, fixing transaction prices with an 
option for regular adjustments. The initial contracts fixed all transactions at that time, 
with projection of a partial liberalization of transactions to MAE starting in 2003, at an 
annual rate of 25 per cent, with complete liberalization in 2006. Until that time, only new 
entrants would be allowed to sell without restriction on the MAE spot market, as a 
measure to encourage new entry. 
Despite these expectations, a large part of the wholesale trade is still actually realized 
outside the MAE through bilateral contracts, in which generators and distributors 
negotiate amounts and prices for a determined period of time. The old energy (secured by 
the initial contracts) was for the large part (nearly 95 per cent) generated by hydroelectric 
plants which had already been fully depreciated and whose running costs were very low, 
when the reservoirs held sufficient levels of water. On the other hand, new entrants had to 
bear high capital cost and/or pay high running costs for imports of natural gas fuel 
denominated in dollars, in the case of thermoelectric plants. Distributing companies, for 
their part, were regulated by ANEEL in accordance with the price cap regulation, which 
did not allow them to automatically add cost increase, to the retail price. Therefore, the 
privatized distributing companies fulfilling their obligations under bilateral contracts for 
the old energy have been reluctant to use the spot market for procurement. A lack of 
demand and the high volatility of the exchange rate after the floating of the real in 1999 
discouraged new entrants. 
 
VII. Privatization – Ownership Changes 
 
With the privatization of electricity in its sights, the government enacted in 1995 the law 
of concessions (Law 8987) and a specific sectoral law of concession (Law 9074) which 
set the following conditions for the exploration of energy services: 
Concession periods of thirty-five years for generation, and thirty years for transmission 
and distribution, renewable for the same period, if concessionaires satisfied the 
operational requirements; 
Hydroelectric generation of 1,000KW or above and thermoelectric generation of 
5,000KW or above would be subject to competitive auctions. Smaller power generation 
could be explored upon notification to the regulatory authority. Generation for self-use 
would need to be communicated and authorized; 
Independent power producers (IPPs) could sell electricity to distributors and large 
consumers; 
Large-scale consumers, of 10,000KW or above, could contract directly with IPPs. The 
criterion of large consumers would be reduced to 3,000KW in eight years (by 2003), and 
could be further reduced by the judgment of the admission authority; 
Ownership of transmission lines comprising the basic network could be auctioned, but its 
operation had to be subordinated to coordination with independent system operators who 
would optimize the use of the interconnected system. 
Eletrobrás was formally incorporated into the PND in May 1995, and made ready for 
privatization. The first privatization occurred in 1995, when the distribution company of 
the State of Espírito Santo (Ecelsa), then controlled by Eletrobrás, was brought to auction 
(Table III). This was then followed by the privatization in 1996 of a distributor in Rio de 
Janeiro metropolitan area, Light, which was also controlled by Eletrobrás, and which was 
acquired by a consortium formed by the French national company EDF and the American 
firm AES, with the participation of other power distributing companies owned by local 
states. 
The privatization moves in the States of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul deserve 
particular attention as they involved the separation of the ownership of vertically 
integrated system, following the CL report recommendation. São Paulo State owned two 
integrated electric power systems – Cesp and Eletropaulo – and a distribution company 
CPFL, which operated in different market areas for historical reasons. CPFL was sold in 
its entirety to a Brazilian business consortium in 1997. Cesp first sold off its distribution 
business and then established Elektro, which was sold to the American company Enron in 
1998. The remaining part of Cesp was divided into three generators (Paranapanema, Tietê, 
and Cesp) and one transmitter (CTEEP). In the privatization of 1999, the American firm 
Duke Energy acquired Paranapanema and AES obtained Tietê. Eletropaulo, for its part, 
was unbundled into four companies: two distribution firms (Eletropaulo Metropolitana 
and Bandeirante), one generator (Empresa Metropolitana de Águas e Energia Elétrica: 
EMAE), and one transmission company (Empresa Paulista de Transmissão de Energia: 
EPTE). In 1998, Eletropaulo Metropolitana was sold to the EDF-AES consortium, which 
also obtained the control of Light.14 In the same year, Bandeirante was sold to a local 
consortium, VBC. In total, the State of São Paulo privatized the entire distribution 
business and a part of generation, maintaining control over the generation sections of 
Cesp and EMAE and the transmission business of CTEEP and EPTE, which are planned 
to be merged together in the near future. 
In the privatization of CEEE by Rio Grande do Sul, the state separated the distribution in 
the North-Northeastern region (sold to AES) and Central-Western region (sold to VBC). 
CEEE still maintains control over distribution in the Southern-Southeastern region, which 
includes the state capital, Porto Alegre. Generation and transmission were separated from 
CEEE and joined into another state company, CGTEE. 
Several observations can be drawn from Table III. First, the privatization of the electricity 
sector has been ongoing for more than six years, but the process is not yet completed. 
This is very different from the case of telecommunication, where the Telebrás system was 
totally privatized in 1998 (see, for example, Goldstein 1999). Although the first 
privatization took place even before the presentation of the CL report, key institutions 
such as ANEEL, ONS, and MAE have been established only gradually. Due to this 
systemic uncertainty, the first privatizations did not attract much interest from investors. 
Secondly, most sales took place by distribution segment. To date, only a few cases of 
privatization of generation have been realized and not a single transmission company has 
been privatized. In particular, there has only been one case of privatization of the 
generation and transmission assets of Eletrobrás,15 with regard to the generation of 
Eletrosul. The integrated power companies of the States of Paraná and Minas Gerais have 
not yet been privatized. Thirdly, foreign companies obtained control of many of these 
companies. Investment by EDF of France, AES of the United States, and Endesa 
(together with its Chilean affiliates Chilectra and Enersis) and Iberdrola of Spain have 
been particularly noticeable. Brazilian electric power operators Rede, Inepar, and 
Cataguases-Leopoldina, as well as financial capital-based consortium VBC, have also 
strengthened their positions. This concentration of ownership implies the possibility of a 
future consolidation of the sector into a smaller number of groups through post-
privatization mergers and acquisitions. Some group formations have already been seen, 
such as Escelsa’s buy-out of Enersul and CPFL’s acquisition of Eletropaulo Bandeirante. 
Also interestingly, Spanish power company Endesa has used its Chilean subisidiaries 
Chilectra and Enersis to make acquisitions in Brazil, such as CERJ, Cachoeira Dourada, 
and Coelce. 
After the slow and incomplete implementation of privatization, the ownership structure 
was reformed into the form depicted by Figure 6, which is still far different from the 
pattern shown in Figure 5. Private ownership is now dominant in the distribution section, 
and the entry of free consumers has started. On the other hand, the generation segment is 
still largely owned by the public sector, and vertical disintegration has not been 
completed. The figures in Figure 6 tell us that almost 90 per cent of electricity is 
generated by the public sector, including the Eletrobrás system (accounting for 52 per 
cent) and state power companies (37 per cent), while private generating companies are 
responsible for only 8 per cent, with 3 per cent being carried out by self-generation by 
distributing companies. The picture also shows that the governance of the interconnected 
transmission has been separated from ownership, and assumed by the ONS. 
 
VIII. Firm Performance 
 In this section, we analyze a data set compiled from the financial reports of the electric 
power companies in order to identify the characteristics of the adjustment carried out 
during the process of ownership reform. The data is reported annually by each company 
to the Security Exchange Commission (CVM), and is available from its website. Table IV 
shows changes in employment and fixed assets, comparing the status before the reform 
and the most recent figures. For ease of comparison, the post-privatization figures 
aggregate all separated companies. For example, data for Cesp after privatization includes 
Elektro, Paranapanema, Tietê, Cesp, and CTEEP. 
Table IV demonstrates that employment fell sharply after privatization, without exception. 
The rate of the reduction reached 40-50 per cent in most privatized firms. Nonprivatized 
companies as CEMIG and COPEL also reduced their work force, but we found that the 
rate of reduction was smaller. However, this rule does not apply generally, because 
Eletrobrás implemented rather deep employment adjustments. 
 In terms of investment, Table IV shows that firms that were not privatized or only 
partially privatized tended to invest less, while the growth of fixed assets of the privatized 
firms tended to be much higher. In particular, members of the group of largest firms 
Eletrobrás and CEMIG did not show any substantial increases. This corresponds to the 
low growth of generation and transmission, as observed in Figure 2 and Table II. With 
regard to the relatively higher growth of investment in privatized distributors, many cases 
correspond to expansions of self-generation capacity, which is allowed by ANEEL up to 
a level of 30 per cent.16 
Table V shows changes in shareholders’ equity/total liabilities ratios. The decline 
of the ratio implies that a growing portion of company assets is being financed by 
borrowings, making them more vulnerable to external shocks. This figure is very 
important for Brazilian companies, because any macroeconomic shock -- such as an 
interest rate hike or sharp devaluation -- will affect financial costs significantly. 
According to the table, there was a tendency by privatized firms to reduce shareholder’s 
equity ratios during the years following privatization, implying an increase in borrowing 
to finance asset acquisitions relative to equity. Most notably, Escelsa and Light, which 
were privatized early on, reduced their shareholders’ equity ratios substantially as a result 
of increased borrowings for the acquisition of Enersul and Eletropaulo Metropolitana, 
respectively. In other instances, CERJ and Coelba increased investment into their own 
fixed assets, as shown by Table IV, and saw continuous declines in their equity ratios. On 
the other hand, while CPFL, Cosern, and Coelce also increased their investments 
significantly, they were sustained by increases in equity financing, leading to increases in 
the equity ratio. The vulnerability of companies with low equity ratios became apparent 
in 1999, when the Brazilian real experienced a sharp depreciation, and interest rates were 
raised substantially to stabilize the economy. In that year, AES Sul, Escelsa, Light, CERJ, 
and Coelba suffered large operational losses, while CPFL, Cosern, Coelce maintained 
stable performance. 
The publicly owned generation enterprises and integrated utilities performed 
relatively well because of increasing electricity demand accompanying growth recovery 
during the second half of the 1990s. Financial data on Eletrobrás and CEMIG suggests 
that particular efforts were made to redirect profits to the reduction of long-term debt, 
instead of investing in fixed assets, to strengthen their balance sheet structures. On the 
other hand, COPEL made substantial investments into fixed assets, increasing the 
composition of debt financing in relation to equity, while making operational profits in 
each year (Table VI). 
To summarize, electric companies carried out a variety of adjustment strategies during 
the period of ownership change in the second half of the 1990s. All of them attempted to 
restore financial equilibrium, firstly by reducing the excessive work forces they had 
acquired during the public ownership period. These adjustments tended to be more 
accentuated in privatized companies. Some privatized companies reduced their equity 
ratios by increasing borrowings to finance their initial post-privatization restructurings or 
for the acquisition of other privatized firms. Larger borrowings translated into 
vulnerability, which was revealed in the 1999 currency crisis. Several companies made 
investments using equity financing, and maintained relatively more stability under the 
turmoil. Among the companies remaining under public ownership, CEMIG and 
Eletrobrás were more defensive in making balance sheet adjustments, while COPEL was 
more expansionist; it carried out smaller employment reductions, increased investment 
substantially, and made more borrowing. 
 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although privatization in Brazil achieved far-reaching results in general, the case of 
electricity was not successful, and left many lessons to be learned. The original idea 
contemplated in the CL report envisaged a shift toward a private ownership model, 
separating ownership into generation, transmission, and distribution. While the 
transmission and distribution segments were to be rigidly regulated, a wholesale marketer 
was created to stimulate competition in the generation market. It was expected that the 
introduction of this new structure would stimulate cost reductions and induce an 
expansion of supply capacity. 
However, rather disappointingly, the new model did not obtain support. While state 
ownership had already been rejected because of the lack of the public sector’s financial 
capability, the future of the market competition-based sector model for electric power 
remains highly uncertain and at this moment we cannot be sure if the market will really 
keep Brazil lit up. Some of the evidence presented in our analysis suggests that 
privatization under high uncertainty led companies to conservative strategies, maintaining 
a passive attitude toward investment and seeking short-term financial gains through sharp 
job cuts. This uncertainty arose from substantial delays in defining new market 
institutions through the establishment of regulatory institutions and clear rules of 
competition as well as ownership structure reform. Making the companies even more 
conservative were the fluctuations of interest rates and exchange rates during the late 
1990s, which increased the financial vulnerability of highly indebted firms. 
Given this anxiety, private firms have tended to demand high rents for private 
information in order to neutralize risks, and to be induced to investment, especially since 
with privatization the government lost access to information on the profitability and 
viability of investment projects. For example, in order to promote investment into 
thermoelectric power generation, the generating companies are demanding much higher 
tariffs, coverage of exchange rate risks for the importation of natural gas from Bolivia, 
and sharing in project risks by equity participation of the national oil company Petrobrás 
and the national development bank BNDES. The government is still unsure of what kind 
of market regulation will be sufficient to amend such market failures, and how great a 
burden should be given to fiscal accounts and consumers’ expenses. It needs to carefully 
calculate whether such costs will really be less than the cost of public ownership. 
An alternative path suggested by the opposition parties, which will be taking power after 
winning the 2002 presidential election, would be to go back to the public sector 
ownership model. Even the outgoing government itself, in view of the energy crisis in 
2001, announced in December 2001 that the structural reform in the past years had been a 
failure, and suspended the privatization of the Eletrobrás system. Still, it has not been 
able to provide an alternative model for the electric power sector, or for rebuilding the 
financial capability of Eletrobrás, nor has it presented any vision of what kind of 
governance structure should be constructed. 
The Brazilian experience shows that privatization driven by macroeconomic problems 
should be carefully reexamined, especially for public utilities that have natural monopoly 
characteristics, given that the market tends to fail to supply socially optimal supply. 
People can be seriously affected when market regulations cannot be clearly defined and 
the regulatory agency is not capable of managing the transition appropriately. 
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Footnotes: 
 
1 Rocha and Kupfer (2002) provide a broad overview of this process. 
2 De Paula, Ferraz, and Iootty (2002) discuss the emergence of mixed consortia, jointly 
formed by foreign and local investors. 
3 For more comprehensive surveys, see Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999), Megginson 
and Netter (2001), and Shleifer (1998). 
4 While Grossman and Hart (1986) discuss comparisons of benefits from acquiring 
vertically/horizontally related firms or contracting them at arm’s length from a private 
profit maximization view, Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) analyze the cases of public 
and private ownership from a government social welfare enhancing view. 
5 It can rightly be considered ideological, because it is not known a priori whether the 
fiscal cost of contracting the private enterprise under regulation is lower than that of in-
house provision by the public sector.  
6 President Collor was impeached in 1992 and replaced by Vice-President Itamar Franco. 
7 Pinheiro (2000) observes that the expansion of state intervention during the period of 
import-substituting industrialization was an expression of a pragmatic approach to 
promoting industrialization urgently, through the occupation by the government of 
open spaces, which could not be filled by the private sector, rather than anything based 
on a well-defined political ideology. The pragmatism was reflected in the fact that in 
the late 1970s to the 1980s, the objective of state ownership was switched to 
macroeconomic stability and external adjustment, and state enterprises were used for 
price control and as borrowers of external credit. In this vein, when the budget deficit 
became the main problem in the 1990s, the government made another pragmatic move 
to large-scale privatization, without any harsh ideological confrontation. 
8 Data obtained from Giambiagi and Além (2000, p. 129, table 5.1). 
9 Data from Baer and McDonald (1998, table 2). 
10 When the CRC was eliminated in 1993 as a part of the tariff reform, it had already 
accumulated credits of approximately U.S.$25 billion, the equivalent of almost 2.5 
years of electricity sales of the entire sector (Ferreira 2000). These credits were utilized 
to cancel delayed payments of state power distributors for purchased electricity from 
Eletrobrás and federal tax. 
11 In order to avoid a concentration of market power, the market share of generation and 
distribution/commercialization should be less than 20 per cent at the national level, or 
less than 25 per cent at the regional level in Southeast and South and 35 per cent in North, 
Northeast, and Central-West. 
12 Final demand will depend on macroeconomic performance, and cost variables will 
fluctuate depending on the exchange rate, fuel prices, and interest rates. 
13 Actually, they have an incentive to sell at any price, because electricity is not storable. 
14 It is reported that EDF and AES will dissolve the consortium in Brazil by an exchange 
of shares, where EDF will concentrate in Light and AES, which also controls ex-Cesp 
generator Tietê, will take Eletropaulo Metropolitana. 
15 Since the power shortage of 2001 revealed an urgent necessity to expand generation-
transmission capacity, the government announced in December 2001 that the 
privatization of Eletrobrás would be suspended for an undetermined period in order to 
increase investment based on centralized decisions. 
16 Detailed information on investment can be found at http://www.provedor.nuca.ie.ufrj.   
    br/ Eletrobrás/. 
 
TABLE I 
Results of Privatization in Brazil (as of July 2001) 
       (U.S.$ million) 
Program 
Revenue 
in Cash 
Transferred  
Debt 
Total  
Result 
National Denationalization Program (PND) 28,234 9,201 37,435 
Telecommunication (Telebrás) 28,793 2,125 30,918 
State governments 27,919 6,751 34,670 
            Total 84,946 18,077 103,023 
Source: BNDES web page (http://www.bndes.gov.br/privatizacao/pndnew.asp), accessed in April 2002. 
 
 
TABLE II 
Growth in Electricity Transmission Lines, by Voltage Capacity 
 
            (km) 
Year 69KV 88KV 138KV 230KV 345KV 440KV 500KV 525KV 750KV 
1970 16,418 1,593 14,531 6,050 2,228 1,097    
1975 22,996 2,082 22,522 11,854 4,405 2,873    
1980 29,094 3,396 31,929 17,700 6,669 5,778 6,185 361  
1985 34,493 3,569 37,587 22,715 7,478 5,763 7,920 1,545 568 
1990 37,600 3,437 45,953 26,996 7,434 5,652 14,783 1,612 1,782 
1995 39,084 3,529 51,913 28,381 8,545 5,923 13,973 1,612 1,783 
2000 39,986 3,291 56,080 34,050 8,952 6,498 18,617 1,612 2,379 
Growth rate (%: annual average):        
1970s 5.7 7.6 7.9 10.7 11.0 16.6 - - - 
1980s 2.6 0.1 3.6 4.2 1.1 -0.2 8.7 15.0 -  
1990s 0.6 -0.4 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.4 2.3 0.0 2.9 
Source: Eletrobrás, Sistema de Informações Empresariais do Setor de Energia Elétrica, Relatório estatístico de linhas 
de transmissão e subestações, various issues. 
 TABLE III 
Privatization in the Electric Power Sector 
 
Name of Firm Year Seller Sub- 
sector Value 
(U.S.$ Million) 
Acquirer Partners 
Escelsa 1995 Federal D 520 Iven and GTD* (BR)  
Light 1996 Federal D 2,508 EDF (France) AES (U.S.) 
CERJ 1996 Rio de Janeiro D 587 Chilectra (Chile) Enersis (Chile) 
Coelba 1996 Bahia D 1,598 Iberdrora (Spain) Previ (BR) 
Cachoeira Dourada+ 1996 Goias G 714 Endesa (Spain)/Enersis 
(Chile) 
 
CEEE Centro-Oeste 1997 Rio Grande do 
Sul 
D 1,372 AES (U.S.)  
CEEE Norte-Nordeste 1997 Rio Grande do 
Sul 
D 1,486 VBC (BR) CEA (U.S.), Previ (BR) 
CPFL 1997 São Paulo D 2,731 VBC (BR) Bonnaire (BR) 
Enersul 1997 Mato Grosso 
do Sul 
D 565 Escelsa (BR)  
Cemat 1997 Mato Grosso D 353 Rede/Inepar (BR)  
Energipe 1997 Sergipe D 520 Cataguases-
Leopoldina (BR) 
 
Cosern 1997 Rio Grande do 
Norte 
D 606 Iberdrora (Spain) Previ (BR) 
Coelce 1998 Ceará D 868 Enersis (Chile) Endesa (Spain) 
Eletropaulo 
Metropolitana 
1998 São Paulo D 1,777 AES (U.S.) EDF (France), Houston 
(U.S.) 
Celpa 1998 Pará D 388 Rede/Inepar (BR)  
Elektro 1998 São Paulo D 1,489 Enron (U.S.) Power Holding (U.S.) 
Eletropaulo 
Bandeirante 
1998 São Paulo D 860 CPFL (BR) EDP (Portugal) 
Gerasul! 1998 Federal G 880.2 Tractebel (Belgium)  
Cesp-Paranapanema 1999 São Paulo G 682 Duke Energy Co. 
(U.S.) 
 
Cesp-Tietê 1999 São Paulo G 472 AES (U.S.)  
Celpe 2000 Pernambuco D 1,004 Iberdora (Spain) Previ, BB Banco de 
Investimentos (BR) 
Cemar 2000 Maramhão D 289 Pennsylvania Power & 
Light (U.S.) 
 
Sealpa 2000 Paraiba D 185.1 Cataguases-
Leopoldina (BR) 
 
Source: http://www.bndes.gov.br/pndnew/compriv.htm. 
Note: VBC = consortium composed of Brazilian business groups, Votorantim, Bradesco, and Camargo Correa. GTD = 
group of pension funds. G = generation. D = distribution. BR = Brazil.  
* Later acquired by EDP of Portugal.  
+ Generation of CEG (electricity company of the State of Goias). 
! Generation of Eletrosul of Eletrobrás. 
 
 
 TABLE IV 
Adjustments of Employment and Investment during the Ownership Reform Period 
 
Employment 
(Number of Employees) 
Fixed Assets 
(R$ Billion at Current Prices) 
 
Before 
Privatization 
After 
Privatization 
Rate of 
Reduction 
(%) 
1995       
(a) 2000 
(b) 
(b)/(a) 
Firms privatized:       
  Escelsa 2,789 1,604 42 638 1,510 2.37 
  Light 10,618 6,142 42 6,472 7,369 1.14 
  CERJ 4,806 1,842 62 509 1,688 3.31 
  Coelba 6,494 3,541 45 1,601 2,343 1.46 
  CPFL 6,786 3,842 43 2,701 4,419 1.64 
  Enersul 2,017 1,048 48 605 721 1.19 
  Cemat 2,483 1,479 40 796 792 0.99 
  Cosern 1,615 656 59 239 329 1.38 
  Celpa 2,914 2,243 23 785 835 1.06 
  Coelce 3,510 1,775 49 569 1,556 2.74 
  Celpe 3,838 2,158 44 568 715 1.26 
  Cemar 2,147 1,689 21 524 571 1.09 
Firms deverticalized and partly privatized: 
  CEEE* 8,760 4,184 52 5,061 5,875 1.16 
  Eletropaulo* 18,199 11,542 37 11,567 11,203 0.97 
  Cesp* 10,165 6,649 35 22,124 28.549 1.29 
Firms not privatized:       
  Eletrobrás
*  
24,311 12,625 48 76,207 77,801 1.02 
  CEMIG 16,452 11,648 29 10,201 9,364 0.92 
  COPEL 8,835 6,142 30 4,918 6,225 1.27 
Sources: Demonstrações Financeiras Padronizadas (DFP) published annually by each company (available from the sub 
site “companhias abertas” of the website of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM] -- http://www.cvm.gov). 
* Figures after privatization and for the year 2000 aggregate those companies which were separated in the process. 
Figures for firms not privatized are simply comparisons between 1995 and 2000. 
 
 TABLE V 
Changes in Shareholders’ Equity/Total Liabilities Ratios 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
CEMIG 0.7446 0.7122 0.7094 0.7073 0.6616 0.6577 
COPEL 0.6979 0.6502 0.6536 0.6306 0.6012 0.6156 
Eletrobrás (consolidated) 0.6588 0.6456 0.6349 0.6794 0.6975 0.6815 
   Gerasul      0.5716 0.5435 0.5334 
CEEE 0.5440 0.4484 0.3329 0.2412 0.2168 0.2143 
   RGE   0.6354 0.6493 0.5912 0.5168 
   AES Sul   0.5952 0.3262 0.1249 0.0488 
Eletropaulo (Metropolitana) 0.5352 0.4135 0.5140 0.3102 0.3346 0.2904 
   Bandeirante    0.3139 0.2280 0.2495 
Cesp 0.5322 0.5144 0.5373 0.5795 0.5449 0.5467 
   Elektro    0.4687 0.5027 0.4699 
   AES Tietê     0.2243 0.3338 
   Duke Paranapanema     0.6446 0.6181 
Escelsa 0.8030 0.8012 0.5082 0.4889 0.3864 0.3623 
Light 0.8498 0.6932 0.6648 0.3785 0.2761 0.2397 
CERJ 0.2230 0.2558 0.2552 0.1531 0.1033 0.1372 
Cachoeira Dourada  0.8139 0.7812 0.7940 0.7741 0.8044 
Coelba 0.5742 0.5324 0.5077 0.4954 0.4221 0.4451 
CPFL 0.7498 0.6916 0.5389 0.5029 0.6999 0.6814 
Enersul 0.5204 0.4233 0.4772 0.5577 0.4814 0.4818 
Cemat 0.2433 0.0226 0.4330 0.4103 0.3303 0.2474 
Energipe n.a n.a. 0.5737 0.6054 0.5649 0.6633 
Cosern 0.4000 0.4575 0.2521 0.2809 0.3616 0.4811 
Celpa 0.4737 0.4663 0.4253 0.5085 0.4606 0.4173 
Coelce 0.5894 0.5435 0.5100 0.4630 0.6996 0.6482 
Celpe 0.7351 0.6924 0.7009 0.6014 0.5735 0.4888 
Cemar 0.6718 0.6130 0.5771 0.4903 0.4694 0.2966 
Source: Same as Table III. 
Note: Shaded cells correspond to private ownership. 
 
 TABLE VI 
Changes in Operational Profits 
                  (R$ million) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
CEMIG 109,357  307,388  266,086  213,090  -96,727  434,655  
COPEL 102,754  160,585  272,507  327,660  286,043  448,347  
Eletrobrás -1,895,716  1,514,945  1,093,839  2,405,358  1,626,768  3,070,843  
Gerasul    -13,574  -111,279  206,733  
CEEE -104,127  -523,887  -690,940  -235,163  -230,299  -149,268  
RGE   -21,233  37,127  -77,479  -77,226  
AES Sul   10,175  20,536  -482,504  -168,963  
Eletropaulo -537,456  207,734  -436,433  391,803  376,591  161,078  
Bandeirante    -108,768  -181,886  160,495  
Cesp -168,409  -491,482  -1,188,147  -540,007  -2,055,299  -307,494  
Elektro    72,913  -486,182  -79,525  
AES Tietê     -194,468  93,672  
Duke Paranapanema     -47,669  16,619  
Escelsa -135,742  119,316  131,117  107,982  -185,923  10,887  
Light -4,192  133,186  227,448  -555  -404,706  -465,939  
CERJ -59,845  -264,185  28,665  60,101  -45,687  -97,821  
Cachoeira Dourada   n.a 1,859  47,072  41,112  68,086  
Coelba -159,105  -4,987  95,242  3,257  -102,805  127,397  
CPFL -53,626  179,892  174,290  199,347  79,043  80,425  
Enersul 23,088  -108,683  -63,876  4,640  -50,838  17,091  
Cemat -86,943  -152,936  -126,703  -21,383  -101,401  -128,457  
Energipe n.a   n.a.  -3,404  401  -18,355  -4,126  
Cosern  -4,008  2,712  -79,206  38,303  20,993  78,855  
Celpa -73,519  42,437  -56,731  -3,440  11,572  -11,361  
Coelce -11,961  17,920  1,991  21,845  46,419  51,347  
Celpe 32,732  22,402  26,004  7,757  10,771  -97,823  
Cemar -40,983  -28,182  13,265  -56,525  -106,365  -177,959  
Source: Same as Table III. 
 
Fig. 1. Results of Privatization and Stocks of Public Debt at Each Administrative Level 
Sources: Results of privatization are periodically published by BNDES, http://www.bndes.gov.br/ 
privatizacao/pndnew.asp; stocks of public debt are taken from IPEA data, http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/. Both 
accessed in April 2002. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Installed Electric Power Generation Capacity: Average Annual Growth Rate 
(%) 
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Sources: 1920-80: Comitê Nacional Brasileiro da Conferência Mundial da Energia, Estatística Brasileira de Energia, 
vol. 5 (1981); 1985-2000: Ministério de Minas e Energia, Balanço Energético 2000. 
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           Fig. 3. Changes in the Electricity Tariff for Residential Users  
(R$ at 2000 prices) 
Sources: Eletrobrás, Anuário de Tarifas de Energia Elétrica, 1993; and Eletrobrás, Tarifas Médias do 
Mercado de Energia Elétrica-Sintese, 2001. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Public Ownership Structure before the Reform 
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                   Fig. 5. Privatization Ownership Structure Proposed by the CL Report 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Current Ownership Structure after the Partial Reform of Ownership 
 
         18.8                124.3                 88.3 
 
 
           7.5 (own generation) 
Note: Figures show electricity generated in 2000 (in 1,000 GWh), obtained from BNDES, “Ranking 2001: Setor 
Elétrico,” Cadernos de Infra-Estrutura, vol. 1, Rio de Janeiro, 2001. 
